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Nelsen, Christian Anne (M.A., Philosophy) 
Integrative Unities and the Persistence of Persons Across Time 
Thesis directed by Professor David I. Boonin 
 
 
In this paper I argue for the position that we (human animals) are essentially 
human animals in virtue of the integrative unities of our bodies. These integrative 
unities also give rise to consciousness, which is embodied, also as a result of the 
integrative unities. Human animals persist through time in virtue of our vital 
functioning. To argue for these positions, I first consider alternate views. Primarily, 
I consider both the psychological view, which I ultimately dismiss, as well as the 
Biological Approach. The Biological Approach (argued by Eric Olson) is the most 
similar to the approach I sustain, and so I take some time to give an exegesis of his 
view, and explain how it differs from my own. Ultimately, I agree with Eric Olson 
that our type of being is essentially human animal, and that we persist in virtue of 
our vital functions. I diverge from Olson in that he centers his explanation in the 
brain stem, whereas I have a systemic approach. I also differ from Olson in that I 
attempt to give an explanation for persons, and well as human animals.  
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Part I: Personal Identity 
 
1: Introduction 
There are many questions involved in determining the nature of personal identity, and 
many different attempts to answer those questions. Why should the issue of personal identity 
matter to us, though? For one, it might be important to us in the face of scientific developments, 
such as cloning, or brain programming or even organ transplants. If scientists were able to 
reprogram someone’s brain to help her forget a horrible tragedy, would the same individual exist 
after the treatment? If someone is horribly burnt in an accident and the only way to save him is to 
replace his entire body with a new material, would the same individual who went into the fire 
come out of the operation? It might be important to us for ethical reasons: if someone does not 
remember a crime he supposedly committed, should he be held accountable for the crime? If a 
single individual is responsible for a young child, but later her body is slowly replaced with 
another, then who is responsible for the child? Knowing who we are and what keeps us existing 
as we are is important for all sorts of reasons.  
These questions are compelling enough to convince me to write a paper on what the 
nature of personal identity is, how identity persists, and what else might be involved in these 
apparently simple questions. In the following paper, I propose and argue in favor of the view that 
personhood is a non-essential property of human animals, and that to persist as one of these 
beings is to be a human body. That is, people are human animals, and being a human person can 
be a property of the human animal. Generally, I argue that personal identity is dependent upon an 
individual’s specific body, and that and individual’s personhood arises as a result of being that 
specific body. I do argue that personhood is a property of some types of bodies, including human 
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animal bodies. It is not personhood that allows individuals to persist across time, but rather the 
regular functioning of human animal bodies.  
In order to argue for this position, however, I first want to be very specific as to the 
question I am answering in the vast field of personal identity. In Part I, I discuss various 
questions, how they differ from each other, and which specific question, or questions, I intend to 
answer. It is important to realize which questions I am trying to answer, because the end result of 
this paper may initially seem inconsistent with a prima facie idea of personal identity. Next, I 
spend a fair amount of time providing an exegesis of other popular accounts. The primary 
alternative to my view is the psychological view, especially as defended by John Locke, and 
more contemporarily, Derek Parfit and Richard Swinburne. Another view that I discuss, and then 
argue against, is the bodily/animalism view promoted by Eric Olson. I take Olson as my primary 
rival, and so I devote Part II to discussing and analyzing his view, the Biological Approach. It 
will also be briefly reviewed in Part I, in order to provide a foil to the psychological approach.  
In Part III, I give my own positive argument. I distinguish a human organism from a 
human person, and argue that although they often overlap, they do not always. Primarily, my 
view is that we are essentially human animals, and accidentally human persons. Our existence as 
persons is dependent on our animalism. Consciousness (which is what gives us personhood) is a 
property of a body that functions in a particular way, but one that cannot be separated from the 
body in which it arises. When a body fails to function in a way that causes consciousness, a 
person ceases to be a person, and reverts to a mere human animal. Of primary importance is the 
identity of the body, which sometimes takes on specific marker, that of consciousness. While this 
marker is exhibited, the same person persists, although that person’s identity is not dependent on 
 
 
 
 
3 
the personhood, but rather the body from which consciousness arises.  This allows the person to 
continue to exist through any series of mental changes and states.  
My last part is brief. In Part IV, I consider various objections for both Olson, and myself 
and show that my responses to the same objections are more satisfactory in some way than 
Olson’s. I also consider objections that apply specifically to my account. I return to these issues 
later on in each part, but for now I want to focus on what specific questions I answer, and how 
others have answered it.  
 
2: What Questions Am I Answering? 
There are several different, but related questions in the general field of personal identity. 
Since there are many, and they all require different answers, it is important to sort out exactly 
what is being asked. Here are the two main questions I aim to tackle:1  
What am I?: This is the first important question which I intend to answer. This 
question concerns the sort of metaphysical ontology that people and persons fill.  
Persistence: This question is of utmost importance to this paper, and is one of the 
main questions I intend to answer. It has to do with what makes a person or 
human last over a period of time. What is it that makes the same person the same 
person from year to year? 
 
For the purpose of comparison, some other common questions from the literature are below. As 
may be obvious, they are related in that they all focus on individuals (or groups thereof), but 
differ in that they focus on different aspects of an individual. The two I focus on are closely 
related because together, they ask: What sort of thing am I (and others like me), and what makes 
me (and others like me) remain that thing? The “Who am I?” question will fall out of the answers 
to the questions I intend to answer (though I do not discuss this overtly). The other question 
                                                
1 I derive these questions from Eric Olson’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on 
Personal Identity.  
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below is a different sort of question from the other three – instead, it is concerned with “what 
matters,” a question that I have some problems understanding.  Here are the questions, along 
with a brief explanation: 
Who am I?: This question asks about a specific individual. I do not intend to 
focus my paper on specific individuals, but of course, the more general question I 
answer will effect this as well.  
What matters in Identity?: This question isolates one of the practical aspects of 
identity; what should we or do we care about when we are considering issues in 
personal identity? Again, although I will not directly address it, it is of tangential 
importance to my paper.  
 
As I mentioned, my primary focus is on what people and persons are, and how they persist 
across time. I conclude that persons are essentially identical to their bodies, which operate in a 
unique way, and that persons persist through their bodies. For the purposes of this paper, I revert 
to the majority of other literature on these topics, which generally defines “person” or “persons” 
as something that has consciousness and a mental life. Both Olson and I (along with many 
others) define “person” the same way Locke did:  
“…a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider 
itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does 
only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to 
me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving 
that he does perceive.”2 
 
I define “human/animal,” and particularly “people,” as those organisms with bodies like us, and 
specifically those who are of the species Homo sapiens. Thus, a person need not be a human 
animal, and vice versa.  
In the next few sections, I provide some common answers to the questions I have 
indicated above. The two most common answers for the questions I ask are the psychological 
view, wherein people are identical to their psychological states. The other primary view is the 
                                                
2 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Book 2: Chapter 27 #9 
 
 
 
 
5 
bodily/animal view, wherein people are identical with their bodies, or often, special parts of their 
bodies (particularly and most often the brain).  After explaining the arguments, I provide 
objections and reasons that these views are not satisfactory.  
 
3: Common Answers – Psychological View 
The psychological view has perhaps been the most popular view in answering these 
questions. Generally speaking, the psychological view is the view that a person is identical with 
their psychological properties, such as memory, preferences, promises, temperament, 
relationships, interests, intelligence, and so on. There are various versions of the psychological 
view, which I discuss below. Importantly, the psychological view often (though not always) 
provides a distinction between psychological attitudes, and bodily identity. As such, this view is 
consistent with Freaky Friday body swap type cases, potentially an afterlife (after the body has 
died, somehow the psychology continues), out of body experiences, and other phenomena that 
could not happen with a purely bodily view of personal identity. For those who stick with a 
psychological view of personal identity, an individual’s continued psychology is what gives that 
individual persistence across time. A body (or part of a body) may be related to a particular 
psychology, but need it not be, in order for a specific individual to continue to exist.  
If a person is identical to their psychological states or consciousness (whether or not the 
psychological states are dependent on the brain, or a soul or immaterial mind), then what is it 
that makes that person persist? The memory view of persistence is a version of the psychological 
view. This view was famously supported and argued for by John Locke, as well as many other 
early modern philosophers. As I described above, Locke says that a person is something that has 
consciousness. In order for a person to persist, Locke argues that “…yet it is plain, 
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consciousness, as far as it can be extended, should it be to ages past, united existences and 
actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of present 
and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong.”3 What Locke is saying in this 
passage is that memories of past experiences are evidence of the same person’s continued 
existence because the person remembers that she did a particular action. For Locke, the questions 
of persistence and “what am I?” are answered by alluding to the nature of memories. A person 
persists so long as they have consciousness that extends backwards: a person is a thing that 
remembers.  
Harold Noonan explains Locke’s view further by isolating the particular kind of memory 
that an agent must have: 
“I can be said to remember my 7 times table…This is factual memory, retention 
of previously acquired knowledge. I can also be said to remember how to pilot a 
plane or do a handstand. This is retention of previously acquired abilities. But 
there is also the memory of events witnessed or participated in…memory of one’s 
own experiences and actions, which one will report in first-person memory 
claims”4 
 
It is only the latter kind of memory that counts for Locke’s view; the memories that count 
must be those that the person remembers from a first-person experience. The other kinds do not 
count, in part because something other than a person could recall those things, and also because 
they do not need to be first-person memory claims.  
Although this may seem like a simple and easy way to sum up what a person is, and how 
they persist, Locke quickly runs into problems. The primary concern with Locke’s view is that 
the idea of memory presupposes that the same person remembering is the person who did act X, 
                                                
3 John Locke. Of Identity and Diversity. Metaphysics: Classic & Contemporary Readings ed. 
Hoy, Ronald C. & L. Nathan Oaklander. Wadsworth Publishing Company: Belmont, California. 
(1991) p 119 
4 Harold Noonan. Personal Identity: Second Edition. Routledge: New York, New York (2003) p 
9 
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or was present for experience Y. This is problematic for several reasons. Most simply, Locke’s 
notion implies that if you do not remember act X, then you did not do it. Likewise, if you do 
remember act Y, then you did do it. Memories are notoriously tricky things, which can be easily 
altered. But even simpler than that is the following issue: Since I do not remember everything 
that I did yesterday, does that mean I faded in and out throughout yesterday? Or that there was 
another person (perhaps even in the body I consider to be mine) doing the things that I do not 
remember doing? That is an absurd conclusion to draw. Second, suppose that there is an evil 
scientist who somehow removes memories from their hosts and implants them into new persons. 
The new persons would then apparently remember doing something that they did not actually do 
or experience. The list of objections runs on, but these are two of the most important.  
Derek Parfit presents an alternative to Locke’s view that does not fall to the same 
objections. Instead of memories and their other mental ilk, Parfit proposes the notion of q-
memories. Q-memories have three different aspects:5 
1. They seem just like memory beliefs 
2. The experience being remembered (or q-remembered) was actually had by 
someone 
3. The belief is dependent upon the experience in the same way memories 
are 
Q-memories promise to save us from many of the complaints against Locke’s 
view, in that they allow for gaps in memory, they allow for fission and fusion cases (more 
on this later) and they allow for memory-center transplants (again, more on this later). 
They seem to provide a way for the psychological view that Locke favored to thrive in a 
modern world (and Locke’s own as well).  
                                                
5 Parfit, Derek. Personal Identity. Metaphysics: Classic & Contemporary Readings. ed. Hoy, 
Ronald C. and L. Nathan Oaklander Wadsworth Publishing Company: Belmont, California. 
(1991) p 171 
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Parfit, though, is interested in answering a different question than the one that I am 
attempting to answer. Instead of addressing the questions, “What is a person and how does it 
persist across time?” Parfit is interested in the question, “What is it that is important to persons?” 
He believes that the answer is psychological continuity, rather than personal identity. Remember 
that psychological continuity is what provides persons with their persistence. Psychological 
continuity is overlapping chains of the various mental attributes (such as memory). Although 
Parfit is answering a different question, it is interesting and informative to see why he answers 
this one, in order to see if his answer can provide any clues to the questions that I am trying to 
answer. At the very least, it will help to clarify the difference between the two questions, and to 
solidify the reasons I have for answering my question in the way that I do. Finally, his notation 
and idea of q-mental entities (memories, along with their other mental phenomenal ilk) may be 
important and helpful to others who wish to defend a psychological view.  
In his book, Reasons and Persons, Parfit concludes (after a series of arguments) that, 
“…personal identity is not what matters. It is merely true that, in most cases, personal identity 
coincides with what matters.”6 He concludes, again after much argumentation, that instead of 
personal identity (construed several different ways), it is psychological continuity that is 
important. More convincingly, imagine that someone is told that her brain is to be somehow split 
into two separate bodies, but only one of the bodies will have psychological continuity with her 
original body. Moreover, one of the bodies is going to be severely tortured, and the other is to be 
treated like a beloved queen. It seems very rational for the woman to hope that the body with her 
psychological continuity is the one treated like a beloved queen, and to feel only altruistic 
concern for the other body. This is so even in the case that her original body is the one to be 
                                                
6 Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons.  Clarendon Press: Oxford (1986) p 282-283 
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tortured, and her psychological “self” is to be in a different body, but treated well. Even though 
she has a different body, what matters to her is her psychological continuity, because she 
perceives (wrongly, I think) that she is identical to her mental states. She may not technically be 
the same individual (for various reasons), but if she gets what she hopes to, then she has gotten 
what was important to her, regardless of personal identity consequences. It may be that she does 
not exist in either body, but rather, two new people do.  
Another view promoted by many is the various brain versions of personal identity. One is 
a sort of mix between the psychological and physical views, and proposes that the cerebrum, the 
part of our brains that includes all our mental processes, constitutes what we are. The person 
follows the cerebrum; if the cerebrum is implanted in another person’s body, then the person has 
merely acquired a new body. As long as the cerebrum is the same, the person is the same, 
regardless of the rest of the body. The lone cerebrum, surviving on machines, could be a person. 
This thesis is driven by concerns from the psychological view, and as such, is a version of the 
psychological view, rather than the bodily view. There is another brainy version, which I discuss 
in detail in Part II.  Ultimately, the brain version of the psychological view proves to be just as 
problematic as the non-brain specific view, and these issues are addressed in the following 
section. 
 
4: Objections to the Psychological View 
 I do not endorse the psychological view, and there are several reasons for this. Some of 
the reasons will not be clear until later, when I describe my own view, but some are because of 
the objections I discuss below. The first objection is the case of the severe amnesiac. Another 
reason is the related cases of fission and fusion, and the final objection on which I focus is the 
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problem of multiplicity. I only give brief responses to these objections; there are plenty of 
lengthy responses in the literature that I encourage the reader to explore on his or her own.  
The case of the amnesiac is compelling because it highlights the significant problem that 
psychology can radically change (not just qualitatively). Basically, the problem with the severe 
amnesiac is that she loses all of her psychological continuity (the overlapping chain), but it 
seems odd, at least to say that she has stopped persisting.  I mention that psychology can 
radically change apparently quantitatively because we are all familiar with cases wherein a 
person’s psychology changes qualitatively. These cases are important to distinguish; what I am 
interested in here is quantitative change, and not qualitative. This is more than a friend 
undergoing a severe depression and, as a result, saying, “Julie just hasn’t been herself since her 
brother died.” Julie survives the depression brought on by her brother’s death, even if her 
personality is radically different as a result. According to the psychological view, it appears that 
the severe amnesiac is not only radically different, but did not survive. 
Let us consider a case in detail. The evil Dr. Forget has captured James Bond, and 
completely erased his memory, as well as all his other mental phenomena. When MI6 finally 
finds Bond’s body wandering around Costa Rica, this man appears to have no psychological 
connection with 007. Instead of vodka martinis, this man prefers Coke. He has no interest in sex 
or fancy equipment and does not know a word of English. He does not remember Moneypenny, 
Q, M or any of his missions.  He never makes clever puns, and is startled at the drop of a hat. 
This man is the exact opposite in every possible psychological way of 007, and regardless of Q’s 
attempts to reverse the changes Dr. Forget has made, throughout the rest of his life, the person 
who shares Bond’s body has no mental connection with who 007 was. Instead, all psychological 
connectedness and continuity with 007 has been shattered. Should MI6 conclude that Bond has 
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stopped persisting, or continue to believe that the man who shares Bond’s DNA, fingerprints and 
characteristic scars is merely radically changed? If MI6 is swayed by the psychological view, 
they will have to accept that Bond the person no longer exists, and this new man they have found 
has the same body that the Bond they knew, but is non-identical to him.  
It does not seem right to me that MI6 should issue an obituary for Bond. Instead, it seems 
that they should issue a report that he has been found, but has undergone complete amnesia. 
Although this new man has no psychological relation to 007, he has a causal relationship to him, 
and that causal relationship is due to Bond’s body. The problem here is not that causal 
relationship exists, but rather that the causal relationship does not suffice for psychological 
continuity. The overlapping chains of psychological continuity are more than causally related; to 
say that they are makes the problem circular. Circularity emerges because psychological 
continuity is supposed to cause persistence across time for an individual. Asserting that the 
person’s persistence causes them to have psychological continuity is circular. Besides, if 
psychological continuity and mental states are what makes a person a person, and what makes a 
person persist, a mere causal relationship just is not strong enough. There must also be 
overlapping mental states, and for the severe amnesiac, there just are not. The same body has 
persisted the whole time, however, and it is at least odd to attribute a different person to the same 
body. 
Another objection is the related cases of fission, fusion, transplant and teletransportation. 
These are not major problems for someone who accepts Parfit’s view, but again, Parfit’s view is 
one of what is important to persons for identity, and not identity itself. The cases of fission and 
fusion are derived from empirical evidence about an amazing plasticity of our brains. It seems, 
from research done with epileptics, that the left and right hemispheres of the brain are able to (at 
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least partially) function independently of each other. For most of us, this rarely, if ever, occurs, 
due to communication between the two hemispheres via the corpus collosum. This part of the 
brain helps the two halves communicate and determines which side does what. Sometimes, in 
cases of severe epilepsy, the corpus collosum is medically severed, in order to help manage 
seizures. This has led to some interesting results; namely, it appears that the left and right brain 
hemispheres can operate independently. Show someone who has had their corpus collusum 
severed a picture of a pencil with their right eye, and their left hand will grope for a pencil, while 
their right hand looks for the stapler the left eye has been shown.7  
What this appears to suggest is that perhaps, the brain could be split and one hemisphere 
placed in a different body. Both hemispheres can play “catch-up” so to speak, and become fully 
developed as a single hemisphere. This is the case of fission, because fission refers to cases in 
which one thing is separated into two things. In this case, one (whole) brain has been separated 
into its two hemispheres. Some might argue that one person is now two, since the one brain that 
had an individual’s psychology is now in two different places, but each part has the same mental 
faculties and memories. Since it appears that psychology is primarily centered in the brain, this 
suggests that were the transplant to proceed without a hitch, one person could exist in two 
separate bodies. Both new persons could have psychological continuity with the original person. 
If psychological continuity is the basis of our definition, it now appears that two identical 
persons are also clearly separate individuals. The two individuals could even go on to have 
separate lives, all while both maintaining psychological continuity with the original, but not with 
each other.  
                                                
7 Noonan (2003) 16-18 
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The case of fusion is the opposite (although perhaps less of a problem). Instead of one 
person being split into two, two people could become one. Suppose that Jack and Jill have been 
in a terrible accident. Jack’s left hemisphere is completely destroyed, but his right hemisphere is 
perfectly fine. Jill’s right hemisphere has also been completely destroyed, but her left hemisphere 
has been perfectly preserved. For some reason, the doctors attending them decide to take their 
saved brain hemispheres and put them into a new body. The new person, JackJill, has 
psychological continuity with both Jack and Jill, and yet continues psychologically forward as a 
single individual.  
Both of these cases are problematic for the holder of the psychological view, because 
they involve multiple individuals that are not themselves identical. Identity is something that 
should be transferable,8 but in these cases, it is clearly not. For example, Susan is currently an 
individual who has a whole brain and psychological continuity since the birth of her body. Now, 
imagine that SusanA is put into a teletransporter, and sent on a really nice vacation, far away 
from her home. This specific teletransporter allows SusanA to remain conscious the whole time 
she is being transferred, and she wonders what the vacation will be like the whole time. It is a 
brief trip but she remains conscious for it. When she finally arrives, defenders of the 
psychological view assert that she is the same person that left her home, because she had 
psychological continuity the whole time. This is the case even if the body she goes on vacation 
with is made up of different atoms than the body she left (the teletransporter sends bodily 
blueprints, but not the same atoms). SusanB has a lovely vacation, occasionally thinking of her 
                                                
8 Identity in the case of personal identity is not the same as in the case of logical identity. This is 
understood. It might be protested here that the sort of identity that involves personal identity 
should not be held to the exact same standards (i.e. transitivity) as logical identity. Although this 
may have some force, I think (but will not argue here) that since the two identities are related in a 
particular way, so too are their properties (including transitivity).  
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friends back home and hoping that they are remembering to feed her dog.  And when Susan is 
sent back from her vacation, the same thing happens, and SusanC goes back home.9 So it appears 
that personal identity in this case is transitive. A is identical to B, and B is identical to C, so A is 
identical to C.  But now imagine that when Susan gets into the teletransporter, there is an error, 
and instead of only sending Susan’s psychological continuity and bodily blueprint through the 
teletransporter, to vacation, both her psychological continuity and her body remain in the 
teletransporter, until she steps out, confused about what just happened. In this scenario, is Susan 
on vacation, or confused in the teletransporter room?10  It looks like A is identical to both B and 
D (Susan who gets confused). How can one person be identical to two separate persons, who are 
equally psychologically continuous with the first? 
 Finally, there exists a problem of duplication or multiplication for the psychological 
view. The duplication problem was hinted at in the case of fission, but goes one step further. 
Perhaps it will turn out to be the case that not only the brain is so plastic that it can begin to 
operate with one hemisphere only, but also the case that it can on a quarter brain, or an eighth 
brain. Or, perhaps some computer genius will figure out how to upload all of our psychologies 
onto a kind of hard drive or something, such that were the hard drive inserted into any human 
brain, the psychology could also be uploaded. This situation suggests that the same psychology 
could exist in as many human brains as it was able to duplicate. And since they would have 
psychological continuity with the original person, again we have run into the problem of 
transitivity of identity. And not just that! Even if we do not accept that transitivity is problematic, 
surely we still do not want to say that 2,000 persons with the same psychological continuity (to a 
given point, to be sure) are the same person. If the “original” person still exists, then how are we 
                                                
9 SusansA,B and C are only supposed to indicate different times, not different individuals.  
10 I borrowed this example from Parfit, Reasons and Persons pp 199-201 
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to know who he is, or to single him out? They have different bodies! They are all in different 
places! The barrage of problems, I believe, is overwhelming.  
 These last two objections are where Parfit’s q-mental properties can be helpful, and this 
is how many philosophers who defend the psychological view will go about defending it. Q-
mental properties could help in this case because it might be possible to make a distinction 
between “real” memories and q-memories. Recall, however, that the definition of q-memories 
also entails real memories, so this distinction may not help so much. This is because, even if an 
individual knows that he may be experiencing a q-memory, he also knows that the q-memory did 
actually happen… but to whom? Furthermore, any particular individual would not be able to tell 
if she was experiencing a real memory, or a q-memory. She might think to herself, “I remember 
wanting a pony when I was a child… but wait, was that me or just someone I have psychological 
continuity with?” Likewise, she might question (more problematically) “I have a responsibility 
to care for this child. Or is that a q-responsibility? Am I, myself, responsible for this child?” If 
we accept that psychological continuity is what gives a person persistence, and a person cannot 
distinguish her psychological continuity from someone else’s (due to q-mental states), who does 
she refer to when she refers to herself? 
Although the psychological view might be popular, I think it has too many problems to 
provide a satisfactory view of personal identity. Eric Olson agrees, and provides yet another 
compelling argument, which I discuss in Parts II and III. I find the psychological view 
shortsighted, which is one reason I turn to its main rival, the physical or bodily view, in the 
following section.  
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5: Common Answers – The Bodily View 
The primary alternative to the psychological view is the bodily view. A version of the 
bodily view that I discuss specifically is one of its versions, animalism. Since my view is a 
version of animalism, I give only a brief overview of bodily approaches in this section. I also 
make clear the distinctions between the bodily, biological and animalism views. Broadly 
speaking, the bodily view is just the view that we are identical to our bodies, in the same way 
that tables are identical to their physical parts. Animalism takes the bodily view one step further 
and asserts that we are identical to the animals that our bodies are. And Eric Olson’s specific 
view, the Biological Approach, suggests that we are identical to our animal bodies functioning in 
a particular way. Part II of this paper will go more in depth as to their views, and criticisms 
therein. Olson is currently the primary advocate for the biological view, and thus, my primary 
interlocutor. It is his views that I primarily discuss in Part II. In this section, I give a general 
outline of the various flavors of the bodily view.  
The bodily view (Olson calls it the Bodily Criterion) is the most broad. Generally 
speaking, it is the idea that persons (or other things) are identical to their bodies. Wherever a 
body goes, there is the person. This is obviously a very intuitive view, and is what we use in 
normal parlance. For example, if Jan and Rachel are standing across the room from each other, 
and Jan asks me where Rachel is, I can point at her body. I do not need to say, “Well, Rachel’s 
body is there, but I’m not sure where Rachel is.” We all presume that Rachel is where her body 
is. If Rachel comes up to me and shows me that she has a cut, she does not need to say, “Do you 
have a Band-Aid? My body is cut.” Instead, she can just say that she has a cut, and I will know 
what she means. When things happen to our bodies, we report them as those things happening to 
us, and not to a part of us.  
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The bodily view is also very similar to the view that is generally attributed to artifacts and 
animals. A table at 3pm on December 18, 2011 is the same table at 3pm on December 18, 2012 if 
and only if it is made up of the same physical material, and that material has the same respective 
location. Of course, its position in the world may have changed, and it may have accumulated 
some scratches or stains, but by and large, if it is the same physical material in the same 
orientation, then it is the same table. Generally, we think that the same holds for a cat, or any 
other animal. My sister’s cat Tutu is the same cat today as she was yesterday because she is the 
same body.11  
In Olson’s book, The Human Animal, Olson makes the case that people (as we know 
them) are a biological kind, like animals. He says: 
 “It may be possible to replace all of your parts, including your brain, gradually 
and piece by piece, with inorganic prostheses in such a way that your mental 
capacities were preserved throughout…The result would be a wholly non-
biological person – with rationality, consciousness, free will, the works – who 
was both psychologically and physically continuous with you. Nevertheless, 
according to the biological approach that being would not be you, for you are a 
biological organism, and no organism could come to be a non-organism.”12 
  
 Our body types, and not our mental properties, separate us from other kinds of animals. 
There could be other types of persons too, that had no bodies or non-organic bodies, but that is 
not what we essentially are. We would be separated from those types of persons as well, again 
because of our bodies, regardless potential similarities in mental properties. The biological 
approach is a type of bodily view that places the emphasis on our specific type of body, our 
human bodies. The specific type of body that counts for something like us has the same biology 
                                                
11 My view has an alternate way of dealing with animal identities, so I am not committed to this 
view. I only use this example to illustrate the simple bodily criterion.  
12 Olson, Eric T. The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford University 
Press: New York (1997) 125 
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as something like us. Under the biological view, a person at t1 is the same person at t2 iff she is 
the same biological organism at t1 and t2.  
 I find this fairly persuasive, but I am not wholly convinced that it is narrow enough to 
help us figure out what we essentially are, and how we persist. It is useful to help us determine 
what it is to persist across time as a certain sort of entity (a biological one). Our persistence 
conditions tell us what sort of changes can happen to our bodies for them to remain the same 
body, which is more than the simple bodily view can do. Any change that is biological is 
allowed, and even necessary; being pregnant and giving birth, growing, healing wounds, certain 
kinds of transplants (this is trickier, but can still be accommodated), dying, developing cancers – 
all of these are more or less major changes that can be accommodated by the biological view.  
On the other hand, when we want to know whether or not the same person persists, and by 
person, we mean something more than just a particular type of organism, this definition is 
somewhat lacking. I discuss this further in Parts II and III. 
The alternate brain version I promised in the previous section centers not on the cerebrum 
and the mental processes focused there, but rather the brain stem, and the biological processes 
centered therein. In Olson’s words,  
“But even here, for that thousandth of a second during which you have no 
brainstem, there is nothing to direct your life-sustaining functions…your capacity 
to direct them is destroyed. So for a thousandth of a second there is no self-
directing event that coordinates the activities of your parts in the unique way that 
biological lives do…there is no living organism there, but only a corpse so fresh 
that its heart is still beating.”13 
 
This is extreme. Because Olson is committed to, and argued in favor of, the biological 
view, he takes it one step further and instead commits himself to the view that a person at t1 is 
identical to a person at t2 iff that person has the same brainstem at both times, regardless of other 
                                                
13 Olson (1997) 141 
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changes to the body or psychology. I find this view far too strong, and also do not think that it is 
a fair implication of the biological view.  
In this section, I introduced various forms of the bodily view. The first view I explicated 
was the general bodily view, which is just that we (and others like us) are identical to our bodies, 
in the same way that artifacts are identical to themselves. Second, I discussed the biological 
view, which is the view that a person is the same person iff he has the same type of biologically 
functioning organism at t1 and t2. Finally, I discussed what Olson sees as the natural implication 
of the biological view, which is the brainstem view. In Part II, I go more in depth regarding the 
biological and brainstem views. I discuss objections to both views, and why I reject the 
brainstem view in favor of a different view of the biological view. In Part III, I fully develop my 
view and foreseen objections to it.  
 
6: Conclusions from Part I 
In this section, I gave two primary answers to the questions, “What is a person and how 
does it persist across time?” The first view I discussed was the psychological view, which is the 
view that a person is identical to her psychological states and persists though her psychological 
continuity. This view has been popular for a long time, and is associated with many early modern 
philosophers (especially Locke), as well as many contemporary philosophers (notably Parfit). 
There are several problems with the psychological view, which is why I ultimately dismiss it.  
The second answer I explicated was the various versions of the bodily view. The simplest 
version of the bodily view is that wherein a person is identical with part or all of his body. 
Notably, one major distinction between the psychological and bodily views is that the 
psychological view asserts that we are essentially identical to our mental states, and have bodies 
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accidentally, whereas the bodily view argues the opposite. I think that there are more reasons to 
align our essential selves with bodies rather than minds. Eric Olson is a primary defender of this 
view – he defends a narrow version of the biological approach. Ultimately, Olson defends the 
position that the brainstem is necessary and sufficient for personal identity. I find this too 
extreme, and will argue against it in the following part.  
 
Part II: The Biological Approach 
1: Introduction 
In this part, I discuss the argument of Eric Olson, whom I consider my primary 
interlocutor. In this section, I clarify Olson’s position, and then give objections to his view. I give 
brief responses to the objections I raise, but deal with my responses more in depth in Part III. I 
also consider the question of whether Olson is addressing the same question as I am, or if his 
concerns are different from mine. Generally speaking, Olson takes a bodily position (which he 
calls the Biological Approach), but ultimately eliminates most of the body in favor of isolating 
the functioning brainstem as the main source of personal identity. He does this because the 
brainstem is the source of all our vital functions; it is what keeps our bodies operating in such a 
way that we can be said to be alive. I see several problems with this position, so after I explain 
his position and argument, I provide reasons to think that his account is less than satisfactory. 
Importantly, I argue that Olson’s account ultimately sets him up for a dilemma. Furthermore, 
neither horn of the dilemma is acceptable to Olson’s view.  
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2: Olson’s Argument 
Olson makes some interesting assumptions in order to get his argument afloat. Most of 
his assumptions are pretty widely accepted in the philosophical community, but because they are 
assumptions I take issue with, I want to address them directly. The first assumption that Olson 
and I both make is that persistent identity is dependent on physical or material considerations, 
rather than something like a soul, or immaterial mind. Olson and I take this view primarily 
because of the various problems that arise from the alternate assumption.14 Olson is not 
committed to the view that there is any sort of dualism; just that in case there is, the biological 
features are the ones that are essential to both our identity and its persistence, rather than the 
psychological parts. As Olson says, “The Biological Approach is intended to be compatible with 
a ‘dual-aspect’ or ‘property-dualist’ theory of mind, according to which psychological properties 
are in some sense non-physical properties.”15 I agree that human animals must be and are 
essentially physical, but that we have different aspects to our physical natures. Although Olson’s 
approach may not necessitate dualism, it is possible that doing so would enhance his argument 
for personal identity. As it is, he is primarily arguing for persistence of a particular organism, 
which may or may not maintain the same psychology, or what some consider personhood.  
It may initially appear that the psychological view and the biological view are not 
actually rivals, but are in fact compatible, even complimentary. The psychological view is what 
makes us persons, and it explains our personhood and what it is to persist as a person. The 
biological approach, on the other hand, explains what makes us human animals, and how we 
persist as such. Prima facie, there may not appear to be any problems. The two views are 
                                                
14 I will not make that argument here, but Olson does it quite nicely in a chapter in The Human 
Animal pp 94- 123 
15 Olson(1997) 126 
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describing different things, and they are compatible because one being could have both a 
biological body and a psychological presence, and thus the two things co-exist in one being 
(though they could be separated). A mental life and psychological continuity is what is essential 
to a person and a biologically functioning body is what is essential to a human animal, and both 
combined is what makes our kind of individual.  
Here are some problems with that view (I call it the joint view), though, and why the 
discussion is generally divided into one or the other, rather than both. A classic problem for this 
view is the issue of communication between the two parts. If the individual is truly that – an 
individual – then how can it be that there are two separate things that work together as one? Do 
the two parts communicate with each other, and how is this facilitated? By a third facilitating 
part? This is problematic because it requires a larger ontology to explain an issue, which 
ultimately creates more problems than it solves. Another problem is the “Too Many Thinkers 
Problem.”  If we all agree that brains think (and that brains are part of our bodies), a problem 
develops wherein the body’s thinking appears to be occurent with the psychology’s thinking. I 
am not particularly swayed by this problem, but it does often make an appearance, and is also 
hard to explain away. The problem is a dilemma: Either the body does not think (which means 
that the brain is not part of the body, or the brain does not think), or the psychology is redundant. 
The joint view also does not answer the question of what we are, essentially. If both are equally 
necessary to being things like us, but they can (and do) often come apart, then which one is us, if 
they do? It is primarily this reason that most philosophers choose one or the other, rather than 
both. 
Another assumption that Olson makes for BA, and one I cannot accept, is that individual 
body parts (including parts of the brain and nervous system) can be isolated and continue to 
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function in the same way. Olson’s assertion may seem obvious. Hearts and other organs can be 
transplanted with little problem, so it looks as though those can function in isolation, at least to 
some extent. Although brain transplants are not yet physically possible, Olson thinks that they 
are metaphysically possible, based on the success of things like heart and liver transplants. 
Importantly, Olson cites the cerebrum as the center of psychology, and the brain stem, or lower 
brain, as the center for coordinating bodily functions.16,17 Olson’s talk about “cerebrum 
transplants,” and “head transplants,” and even “arm transplants” throughout his work make it 
clear that he thinks this is a possibility, albeit one that we have not yet scientifically achieved. In 
tandem with this assumption is the assumption that cerebrums, and cerebrums only, are the 
center and only organism that controls an individual’s psychology, and “non-physical”18 
individuation (things such as thoughts, memories, and so on). My reason for disagreement with 
this idea not that organs can never survive outside their systems, but that they cannot on their 
own, and that to make them do so would be unnatural and complicated. A heart from one person 
can be transferred to another, and operate (that’s the point!), so at least in some sense, I cannot 
deny that organs cannot be isolated. But, the heart is not operating alone. Again, that is the point 
– it is operating within a system to fulfill a particular function of that system. The receiver of the 
new heart will also have to take medication to make the heart function within that system (at 
least initially). The rest of the body sees the heart as an invader, and tries to attack it. These are 
some of the reasons I do not accept that organs can be isolated and continue to function in the 
same way.  Although these assumptions are both widely accepted views, I argue against them in 
Part III.  
                                                
16 Olson (1997) 114 - 118: discussing cerebrum transplants 
17 Olson (1997) 140: discussing brainstem replacements 
18 I say non-physical loosely here. It will become more clear later on that I believe these 
attributes, strictly speaking, are also physical.  
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With these assumptions in mind, I move on to Olson’s argument. Olson asserts that what 
we are, essentially, are human animals. Olson explains:  “[O]nce it is conceded that we are 
material beings of some sort, it seems quite obvious what sort of material being we are: we are 
living animals.”19  For a human animal to persist, it needs a certain set of vital functions, which 
provide it with biological life.  Olson is happy to defer to scientists about what it is to be a living 
organism, and what Olson (along with the scientists) says is important to be a living organism is 
“…it’s capacity to direct those vital functions that keep it biologically alive…”20 Those vital 
functions include things such as metabolizing, exchanging oxygen and carbon dioxide, digesting, 
maintaining an appropriate body temperature and blood pressure, and healing wounds. In order 
to encompass the variety of vital functions that exist, Olson clarifies: 
 “By ‘life-sustaining’ functions I mean those that sustain life in the biological 
sense: they are those functions that keep an organism alive in the sense in which 
not only human beings, but also cockroaches and cabbages, are alive. There are 
certain features that distinguish biological organisms from non-living things.”21 
 
Of course, there are other functions as well, and clearly, it is not the case that an organism 
must have all of these functions in order to properly be called a living animal. These vital 
functions just happen to be markers of what it is to be a living organism.  
An interesting point that Olson makes about these vital functions is that they should 
primarily occur organically. By “organically,” Olson refers to something that is involved (strictly 
speaking) in the metabolic process. As such, things like dialysis machines, hip replacements or 
pacemakers are non-organic.22 I find this an interesting position, and one that I am liable to 
disagree with; although dialysis machines are external to bodies, surely they are part of the 
                                                
19 Olson (1997) 95 
20 ibid 135 
21 ibid 112 
22 ibid 135 
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metabolic process. For someone with kidney failure, his dialysis machine is necessary for his 
continued metabolism. This view of Olson’s is important to his argument, which is the reason I 
mention it now.  
So it seems that the vital functions, in all their various forms, are the thing that points at 
identity, and persistence. This is the part of the argument where Olson and I most dramatically 
part ways. Olson asserts that since these vital functions are what are important, and the brainstem 
controls of these vital functions, that makes it the lone necessitator of both identity and 
persistence. The brainstem is what controls these functions, and if it were to be removed, or 
stopped, for even a very brief time, the animal would be deprived of its ability to function, and 
would therefore cease to persist (even in the case that other organs continue to function). Olson 
explains, “As soon as your brainstem is destroyed, you lose the capacity to direct your vital 
functions…you cannot survive brainstem replacement for the same reason you cannot survive 
annihilation and replacement by a perfect duplicate.”23 A new human animal could perhaps come 
into existence, but it would not be the same human animal as the one prior.  
Olson’s main points are basically as follows: biological life itself is what is important to 
persistence and identity, and this is because we are human animals. Animals are distinguished by 
living in a particular sort of way. Science determines what constitutes life, and what appears to 
constitute life is a particular set of functions that all living bodies perform, but that no inanimate 
bodies do. This set includes functions such as metabolizing, digestion, wound healing, regulating 
body temperature and the exchange of carbon dioxide and oxygen. In human animals (at least), 
these vital functions are primarily controlled and monitored by the brainstem. Regarding the 
relationship of the brainstem to a human animal, Olson asserts that, “…it perished when its 
                                                
23 Olson 140 - 141 
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original brainstem is destroyed (which may be a gradual process), for that destroys its ability to 
coordinate its life-sustaining functions.”24 Thus, the brainstem is the most important physical 
aspect to identity and persistence. In fact, without the brainstem, no human animal would 
continue to live or persist. Any loss (yes, any! even brief) of brainstem, or brainstem functioning, 
stops a human animal from persisting, and thus ends its identity as a human animal.25   
Olson sets up his argument in favor of the BA as a response to the Psychological 
Approach (hereafter PA). The advantages of the BA over the PA are too many to list here, but 
importantly, Olson thinks that BA is preferable because PA and the Lockean view of personhood 
are incompatible, but that the Lockean view of personhood is compatible with BA. According to 
Olson, the Lockean view of personhood is, “The idea that personhood is a complex 
psychological property: the difference between a person and a non-person is a difference in 
psychological capacities.”26 This may sound an odd thing for Olson to use in an argument, 
because he defends a view that does not focus on psychological continuity or other psychological 
properties. Olson can (and does) agree with the holders of the psychological view on what the 
definition of a person is. He just does not think that the definition of personhood that they both 
agree on is actually compatible with the psychological view. Recall, however, that Olson thinks 
that his view is consistent with property dualism. Although he argues that it is not the 
psychological matters that are essential to persistence and identity, he recognizes (along with 
Derek Parfit) that these sorts of things do matter to us, at least for some social or pragmatic 
reasons.  
                                                
24 Olson (1997) 142 
25 Olson (1997) appeals to this several times, most notably p 141 
26 ibid 105 
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Olson asserts that accepting the Lockean view of personhood means that, “…nothing 
could fail to be a person just because of its modal or dispositional properties.”27 In other words, 
persons are necessarily persons, and could not have failed to be. This assertion sets up a 
dilemma, which separates the Lockean approach from the PA: “…either the Psychological 
approach would not be true of all people (in which case it would be false), or the being in 
question would not be a person (in which case the Lockean Account would be false).”28 The first 
horn of the dilemma emphasizes that there are, or could be, persons29 who do not have the 
persistence requirements that the psychological approach uses. For instance, perhaps there is a 
being that has a gappy psychology. It is usually rational and self-aware and has all of the other 
mental phenomena that we associate with persons, but it occasionally undergoes an amnesiatic 
fugue state. When it awakes from these states, it has a different psychology every time. Olson’s 
point is that this being appears to be a person, but it does not have psychological continuity in the 
way that the psychological view requires. The second horn emphasizes that if such beings did 
exist, then they would not be persons, which is contrary to the Lockean view.  
Of course, a defender of the PA may counter that they do not intend to defend the 
Lockean approach, and when they talk about psychological continuity, they mean something 
different. This seems like a stretch, however. Most who will defend the PA do so because they 
also want to defend the Lockean approach, which is that people are determined by their 
psychological properties, such as being rational, self-conscious, et cetera. Olson argues against 
the PA because he thinks that it is inconsistent with the Lockean approach, which is a popular 
and widely accepted view of personhood. He believes that it is consistent to hold the Lockean 
                                                
27 ibid 
28 ibid 
29 In the previous passage, Olson means “persons” as I have defined it. He is just not as careful 
about separating the terms “persons” and “people” as I am, which he explains on page 6 (1997).  
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approach only if the psychological properties of a person are not also the essential properties. 
This appears to be the reason he defends the BA, and allows it to be consistent with property 
dualism.  
He also contrasts BA with what he calls the Bodily Criterion (hereafter BC). The BC is 
different from the BA in an important way. According to Olson, the BC is the view that, “If x is a 
person at time t and y exists at t*, x = y if and only if the thing that is x’s body at t is y’s body at 
t*.”30 This is distinct from the BA because the BC identifies a person with his or her physical 
body, and nothing else. The BC requires us to define what a body is, and stick to that as far as 
persistence and identity are concerned. This is problematic, because bodies are very difficult to 
define. To make the problem clearer, remember the Ship of Theseus: every so often, a part is 
replaced until after a long while, none of the ship is physically the same. Apply the same concept 
to a human: If a human was born seventy years ago, she has undergone countless physical 
changes in the last seventy years. Whether or not the exact data is true, popular science posits 
that a human body sheds all its cells and regenerates them approximately every seven years. If 
this is the case, then the seventy-year-old woman has had no less than ten bodies throughout 
“her” lifetime. I say “her” lifetime, because if the BC is correct, and we are identical with our 
bodies, and this woman has had several different enumerations of bodies, then it is difficult 
(perhaps impossible) to argue that she is the same person that was born so long ago. This is 
distinctly a problem for BC and not BA because BC is concerned primarily with the actual 
physical parts, whereas BA is concerned with functioning. It is one of our vital functions to grow 
and replace cells, so it is expected, even required by BA that human bodies undergo this sort of 
                                                
30 Olson (1997) 142 
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change. If BC were construed to include vital functioning, then it would not be a problem for BC 
either. I am just trying to emphasize the most basic type of BC, for the purposes of comparison.  
Olson gets around this body problem with his Biological Approach. Although he thinks 
that we are human animals, who necessarily have, and are defined by our bodies, the BA allows 
natural processes, such as the regeneration and replacement of dead cells, to occur. By 
identifying the processes themselves (as centered in the brainstem), the BA allows bodies to 
change, and undergo normal bodily functions that the BC does not, at least prima facie. The 
point is that the BC centers on only the physical manifestations of bodies, whereas the BA also 
accounts for natural bodily functioning, which goes above and beyond the pure physical matter 
of bodies. It is just that the BC emphasizes purely the physical bodies alone, without describing 
how they can persist through change. The BA has an advantage, because it emphasizes processes 
(and the capacity of the brainstem to affect those processes) in the body, which naturally entails 
changes that bodies undergo, while still persisting.  
To clarify and make overt the situation that Olson (and I am) is in, here is a rough 
hierarchy of the views I have discussed in this chapter. The Bodily Criterion is the main 
alternative to the psychological approach, because it claims that what is essential to beings like 
us is our bodies, rather than our psychologies. The most simplistic BC (which Olson argues 
against) gives human animals the same persistence conditions as artifacts. As long as the same 
physical material is in the same place, the same entity exists. Olson argues against this view, in 
favor of animalism. Animalism is a version of the BC because it maintains that bodies are what 
are essential to beings like us, but it adds an additional requirement that we have animal bodies. 
Olson takes this notion even further, arguing that not only are we animal bodies, but that these 
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animal bodies function in a particular way (the BA), and that this particular way is organized by 
the brainstem. 
 
3: Objections and Further Considerations 
Now that it is more clear what Olson’s position is, and why that is his position, I want to 
move on to objections against his view, and further considerations that are not taken into 
account. First, I give the objections and the expected replies, and then I add some more 
considerations. I argue that the responses to the objections to Olson’s view are unsatisfactory, 
and will use this dissatisfaction in Part III to encourage readers to accept my view over Olson’s. 
The same is true for the considerations; these are concerns that I think Olson does not (or cannot) 
adequately address with his thesis, but which I hope to address with mine.  
The first objection I consider concerns the role of the brainstem in Olson’s theory.31 It 
seems clear that the physical brainstem itself is not the important part of Olson’s theory, 32 but 
rather the function that the brainstem performs. Of course, Olson is also committed to the 
position that no non-organic part can be a part of a human animal’s body. This brings up a slew 
of questions regarding what is important to Olson, especially as to what can be changed, and 
what the role of the brainstem is, precisely. To put this iteration of the objection more precisely, 
if what is important to Olson is the vital functioning of the body (because this is what constitutes 
life), then how is it the brainstem alone the necessary constituent of persistence and identity? 
Surely in order to fulfill vital functions, other parts (lungs, heart, stomach) are necessary. How is 
it possible for the vital function of respiration to occur without lungs, or at least lung-like 
                                                
31 Thanks to Ben Rohrs for his help in developing this objection, along with a few related ones.  
32 Here are some reasons to think that Olson agrees with this statement: an isolated brainstem 
lying on a table is not a human animal. Once a human animal has died, that animal ceases to 
persist, but still contains a physical brainstem.  
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organs? It would appear that other bodily parts are as necessary to vital functioning and living as 
the brainstem is, even if it is the brainstem that sends the signals, or has the capacity to organize 
vital functions.  
I suspect that Olson has several responses to this critique. In the first place, he argues 
that, while other parts can be removed or replaced without ending the persistence of a particular 
human animal, and are with some regularity, brainstems cannot be removed or replaced. Unlike 
hearts or kidneys, “As soon as your brainstem is destroyed, you lose the capacity to direct your 
vital functions…suppose Descartes’ evil genius annihilates you and replaces you with a perfect 
duplicate a thousandth of a second later…what happens during that thousandth of a second is 
enough to bring your existence to an end.”33 But this is not the only response.  Consider some 
alternatives: as long as the brainstem functions, the vital functions that create life can still occur. 
Even if your kidney is removed, your brainstem may still send out signals that would make the 
kidney function, if it were there. Furthermore, even if the kidneys are no longer functioning, the 
brainstem still sends out signals to the rest of the body to ensure that the other vital functions still 
occur.34, 35  
This trifecta of responses is not satisfactory to me. The first response is glib, appealing to 
whole body functioning when the objection concerned only the brainstem. If the body could 
continue to function without the brainstem intact (as it can, and I show in Part III), and vital 
functioning is what gives us persistence, then why does it matter if the brainstem is there or not? 
To the second response, I reply that it does not appear as though the vital function that the 
kidneys are in charge of continues even when the brainstem sends signals (if indeed it does), and 
                                                
33 Olson (1997) 140 - 141 
34 This is an important empirical question, for which I unfortunately do not have data. Certainly, 
if it is the case, it is a response that Olson would give.  
35 Thank you to David Boonin for this response. 
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without that vital function, the animal will cease to function, regardless of how many signals the 
brainstem sends. And to the third response, my reply is that, since the failing of the kidneys 
sends the rest of the body into failure as well, it does not appear to matter how the brainstem 
functions – the rest of the animal will cease to function so as to continue life.    
A related concern of mine focuses on transplants. Suppose you are undergoing kidney 
failure, so your doctor removes your kidney, puts you on dialysis, and goes about finding a 
healthy kidney to replace your damaged one. Olson is committed to the idea that the dialysis 
machine is not part of you, because no part of you can be inorganic. Olson does not think that the 
dialysis machine is part of you because it is not “caught up” in your biological functioning. This 
seems blatantly false to me, but I will allow Olson this distinction anyway. Perhaps the doctor 
discovers that your identical twin sister is an appropriate person to donate a kidney. Live 
transplants from relatives are most likely to succeed, and often have the added benefit of 
matching some or part of DNA, which makes the organ less likely to be rejected. Living organs 
often start functioning immediately as well.36 It seems at least plausible that Olson would accept 
that although you lost your original kidney, the new kidney is now part of the human animal that 
is you, since it functions due to its communication with your brainstem. But if the situation is 
different, it might be the case that you end up with a brainstem communicating with a kidney-
like organ, which is not technically part of you. Perhaps instead of a living kidney from a close 
relative, you receive a kidney from a stranger who has died in a car accident. Does this kidney 
still become yours? Or perhaps scientists have learned to grow kidneys in the lab, but they must 
make use of some plastics or other “non-organic” materials in order to make the kidney function 
correctly. Finally, even if you do get a human animal internally grown kidney, most organ 
                                                
36 National Kidney Foundation: 
http://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/fs_new/Q&Alivingdon.cfm 
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donation recipients must be on medications to keep their bodies from rejecting the organ. This is 
suspect for two reasons: first, the brainstem may communicate with the kidney somehow, but 
non-organic medications must be used to allow this communication to occur. Second, even if the 
brainstem for some reason can communicate or control the new kidney, the rest of the body may 
still reject the kidney. The second reason is problematic for Olson’s view because although the 
brainstem may still have the capacity to direct the functioning of the new kidney, the rest of the 
body is acting in such a way to keep the vital functioning from happening. The obvious choice to 
me in this situation is to give up isolated brainstem functioning as the persistence condition for 
the human animal. I propose instead going with body-system functioning, or what I call 
integrative unities. This is a version of the thesis I will defend in Part III.  
 
4: Conclusions for Part II 
In this part, I have examined the argument of one of my primary interlocutors, Eric 
Olson. Although he handily defeats arguments for the Psychological Approach, his alternative 
argument for the Biological Approach has some objections that concern me. Olson’s first 
assumption is that once we accept that humans are material beings, it is immediately clear that 
we are essentially human animals. And animals, he thinks, are essentially living beings. To live, 
or be a living being, is something that is determined by scientists, but it appears that scientists 
can agree that a certain set of vital functions indicate life. These vital functions are functions 
such as metabolizing, respiring, circulating blood, digesting food, and other such things that most 
bodies do on a regular basis. The brainstem appears to be the lone necessitator of these vital 
functions, in that is has the capacity to control them. For these reasons, Olson argues, if the 
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brainstem stops working or is destroyed, its associated animal (human or otherwise) ceases to 
exist.  
I also examined some objections and considerations for Olson’s Biological Approach. 
Some of these are more problematic than others. But the biggest issue I see (and one that I think 
my proposal can account for) is the tension that Olson has between the physical brainstem and 
the brainstem functioning. I address some of these issues more in depth in the next section.  
Another thing I want to attend to briefly is whether or not Olson is addressing the same 
question I am, or, if like Parfit, his concern lies elsewhere. As I discussed in Part I, Parfit’s 
primary concern is what matters. The conclusion that Parfit draws is that what matters is 
psychological continuity, because this is what guarantees certain mental faculties stay intact, and 
mental faculties are a primary way we have of identifying each other. Olson obviously dismisses 
psychological continuity and mental faculties as something that is essential to beings like us. He 
does this in favor of biological life, and life’s contributing vital functions. But what question is 
Olson answering, and what relation does it have to the question I am asking? Remember that my 
concerns lie in what causes human persons to persist, and what a human person is. Olson is more 
concerned with what a human animal is, and what a human animal’s persistence conditions are. 
He thinks (as I do) that human animals and human persons are different entities, which do not 
always overlap each other, but often do. Both of us argue for the position that some human 
animals are also human persons. We also both agree that something could be a person without 
being a human animal, and that something could be a human animal without being a person. 
Finally, we both agree that what is important to persistence has something to do with bodily 
functioning, and the physical body. Olson’s view is consistent with Parfit’s, because he thinks 
that it is possible that a human animal could have psychological continuity, and that 
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psychological continuity could matter to that human animal. In the end, however, Olson’s views 
differ from mine in the way that we think that human animals persist, and how human animals 
are related to human persons. These issues will be more fleshed out and obvious in the following 
section.  
 
Part 3: Integrative Unity View 
 
1: Introduction 
In the first part of this paper, I gave an exegesis of the most common view of personal 
identity (the psychological view), as well as arguments against it. In the second part, I continued 
with an exegesis of the view of Eric Olson, who is the primary interlocutor for my view. In this 
part, I give positive arguments for my own view. Like Olson, I think that life is dependent on a 
variety of vital functions. Like Olson, I think that the Lockean view of persons is correct. And, 
like Olson, I think that vital functions are imperative to identity across time. I defer to his 
arguments for these claims. Unlike Olson, however, I do not think that the brainstem is the lone 
necessitator of these vital functions. Furthermore, I think that there is one effect of vital 
functioning that Olson has overlooked – consciousness. These two areas in which I differ from 
Olson inform my thesis: human persons are37 human animals that persist through systematic 
functioning of the human animal.  
As I discussed in Part II, Olson’s Biological Approach (BA) seems correct in that it 
addresses life as the primary facilitator of persistence for biological creatures, and it also seems 
correct in pointing to vital functions (according to biologists) as the aspect that makes life occur. 
Olson takes these propositions and concludes that since the brainstem is the central feature of 
                                                
37 In the strong sense of is: identical 
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human animals that controls vital functions, then too is the brainstem the central feature of 
persistent identity amongst human animals. It is at this point that I no longer agree with Olson. 
As discussed previously, I believe that there are too many problems and inconsistencies with 
isolating the brainstem alone. In order to keep the attractive parts of the theory, while leaving the 
accumulating brainstem problems behind, I propose instead a systemic, or integrative unities, 
approach. One benefit of this approach over Olson’s (and others) is that it provides not only the 
persistence conditions for a human animal, but also for a human person, which it does by 
incorporating the human animal function of consciousness.  
Before I elucidate my view, I want to return to the questions I posed back in Part I and 
confirm that they are still relevant, and that I am consistent in answering them. The questions I 
promised to answer were the “What am I” question, and the “What does it take for me to persist” 
question. The way that Olson answers the “What am I” question is to posit that, essentially, what 
I (and others like me) am is a living human animal. The answer to the persistence question for 
Olson is that human animals persist so long as they have life and vital functions, which are a 
process controlled by the individual’s brainstem. I, too, answer the “What I am” question with 
the response that I (and others like me) am essentially a functioning human animal, and I answer 
the persisting question by asserting that human animals persist so long as they are (undergoing) a 
certain set of systematic functions. The reasons I answer the way I do will become more clear in 
the following section. 
There is a further question here as well, one to which both Olson and I have an answer. 
The question is whether or not we address personal identity, which is the identity of a particular 
person, or if what we are arguing for is the persistence of a different type of identity, such as 
organismic or bodily. Olson is only arguing for organismic identity, and setting the personhood 
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of the individual organism aside. Olson thinks that multiple views of personhood are compatible 
with the brainstemmed Biological Approach. Human animals are essentially human animals, and 
not essentially persons; an individual human animal could become a different person through 
means of an upper brain transplant (for example). I am also arguing for organismic identity, 
because I agree with Olson’s arguments that we are essentially human animals. Olson and I 
diverge, however, because I think that the systemic view provides a means to identify 
personhood with organismhood. So, beyond organismic identity, I believe that my version also 
provides an account of personal identity.  
 
2: The Biological Approach, Systemically 
 As I argued in Part II, there are several problems with Olson’s approach, most of which 
stem from his isolation of the brainstem as the lone necessitator for maintaining identity. Recall 
the dilemma that is a result of Olson’s view: either the physical brainstem itself is what is 
important to identity (which means that corpses, early fetuses, a lone (even functioning!) 
brainstem on a table, are all human animals) or the functions that the brainstem officiates over 
are what is important to identity (which means that the brainstem alone is not the important part). 
My alternative is to say that it is the vital functions that provide human animals with our 
identities and persistence conditions, but that instead of focusing those vital functions on a single 
organ (or rather, part of a single organ), to take a systemic approach to them. For instance, 
instead of isolating the function of respiration to the brainstem (as Olson does, by asserting that, 
since the brainstem sends the signals to the lungs that make it respire38), the whole brain, as well 
as the lungs and even the heart are intimately involved in making this vital function occur.  
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2.1: Integrative Unity and the Systemic Approach 
 The systemic approach to the BA emphasizes bodily systems as that which provides vital 
functions to an organism. In turn, this provides life to individuals. D. Alan Shewmon is talking 
about what I call a systemic approach when he gives a criterion for what he calls “integrative 
unity”. Shewmon’s definition of integrative unity (and my working definition of systems) is as 
follows:  
“Integrative unity” is possessed by a putative organism (i.e., it really is an 
organism) if the latter possesses at least one emergent, holistic-level property. A 
property of a composite is defined as “emergent” if it derives from the mutual 
interaction of the parts, and as “holistic” if it is not predicable of any part or 
subset of parts but only of the entire composite.”39 
 
Applying this definition to what I would like to call the systemic approach, Shewmon points out 
that anything in a system (or with integrative unity) has two necessary components. First, it has 
“at least one emergent, holistic-level property.” An emergent property is one that comes from the 
interactions of parts to create a whole. A common example of an emergent property is the taste 
of salt; salt tastes salty not because either chlorine or sodium tastes salty, but because their 
combination does. This is a weak form of supervenience, in that the parts together create 
something more than the parts individually, but changing the parts also changes the way the 
whole works together. Shewmon also indicates that the property is holistic. Shewmon’s 
definition is a working definition for systems as well. I agree with him that a system (or 
integrative unity) has at least these components. For example: Shewmon thinks that an isolated, 
but conscious whole brain has integrative unity, and is therefore a putative organism. This brain 
organism would be very weak and not apt to survive alone for very long, but it does have at least 
                                                
39 Shewmon, 4 
 
 
 
 
39 
one emergent, holistic-level property.40 The one lone emergent, holistic property is the 
consciousness property.41 As soon as this is gone, the brain fails to be anything other than just a 
mass of cells, precisely because it has lost the emergent, holistic property that made it an 
integrated unity.42  
 Note, however, that there is a difference between an isolated brain that has consciousness 
and a whole body, or even bodily system. Perhaps the lone, isolated brain with consciousness 
may suffice as an organism, in that it has an integrated unity. But it is not a whole organism, 
because it cannot self-sustain; it does not by itself have life. An entire body, however, which has 
various systems, is self-sustaining – it does have life. It can make use of its various systems and 
survive independently of any other being.  The whole organism has vital functions that the 
isolated but conscious brain does not, which give the whole organism life in a way that the brain 
cannot have. The isolated brain does not have life and it cannot survive alone. This is contra 
Olson in that for an organism to persist, it must have life. The isolated brain exists in some sort 
of in-between stage.  
 The integrative unity, or systematic approach, focuses on the whole organism instead of 
individual parts. This allows us to avoid the brainstem dilemma that Olson pits himself against 
by identifying a single organ (or, part of an organ) as the center for organismic persistence. But 
why think that the systematic view of the entire organism is a good way to go? If the whole brain 
                                                
40 Shewmon, 5 
41 I do not think that it is possible to have this sort of situation, and this is due to my view on 
what constitutes consciousness. But for the sake of exegesis on Shewmon’s view, I explore it 
here. It will become more obvious later on why I do not think that individual brains can have this 
sort of emergent, holistic property.  
42 I will leave it to the scientists to say what underlying physical process would have to change in 
order for the brain to lose consciousness. Perhaps some specific group of cells, or some certain 
number of cells would have to die. As I mentioned in footnote 5, I am skeptical that an individual 
brain could have consciousness, for reasons I discuss later.  
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could have integrative unity, then why not posit just the whole brain, rather than the whole 
organism? 
 There are several reasons to posit the whole body rather than simply the brain as the thing 
that causes persistence for an individual. As I have discussed above, although the whole brain 
may have a weak sort of integrative unity, it does not have the sort of systemic wholeness that 
the entire body does.  The body is a robust system of integrated unities; it undergoes more 
changes and has more vital functions than the brain alone can. If we consider the body itself as a 
system of integrated unities (or an integrated unity of systems), the result is that we get a very 
robust, flexible entity from which to draw identity. The same is not the case for brain-only (or 
brainstem only) approaches. The whole body approach allows systems to rely upon each other to 
preserve identity in the case that one or more systems fail, either permanently or temporarily.  
For demonstration of this assertion, consider the following case: Dolores is in a terrible 
car accident, but because of the way the accident happened, her body (other than her brain) is 
largely still healthy. Her whole brain, however, is failing, and will soon stop working altogether. 
Fortunately, there is a doctor (Dr. Hfuhruhurr) on call who has developed a new process of 
replacing brains (including brainstems) such that when Dolores awakes, she will be just as she 
was prior to the accident (with the exception of the new brain).43 What makes Dolores the same 
person after the accident, even with her new brain? Since the rest of her body continues function 
as an integrative unity throughout the process, her identity is preserved. This is not the case for 
Olson, or for most who hold a physical version of the psychological view. It is not the case for 
Olson because Dolores’ brainstem has been replaced. It is the not the case for those who hold the 
psychological view because Dolores’ upper brain, where her psychology is housed, has been 
                                                
43 Thanks, Steve Martin: The Man with Two Brains  
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replaced, and even more so, it was not her psychological continuity that maintained her identity 
for her during the brain replacement.44 But it seems natural to think that Dolores is qualitatively 
the same pre and post accident (with the exception of the brain) that she is the same person. If 
Dolores were to have a heart replacement or a liver replacement, and was qualitatively the same 
pre and post those operations as well (with the exception of her new organ), we would have good 
reason to think that she was numerically the same person as well. Why should it make a 
difference that it is her brain, rather than one of these other essential organs? 
One (popular) reason the brain might have special status over the other organs is that it 
seems like the brain has special powers. These supposed special powers include consciousness or 
psychological powers and vital function organization. In this way, both some psychological 
theorists and many animalism theorists (including Olson) give special status to the brain. But 
here are some relatively mundane reasons to think that the brain does not deserve so much 
special status:45  
• I have a gym locker. If you asked me what the combination to my lock was, I would not 
be able to tell you unless I (a) move my fingers in a particular way, as if undoing the lock 
and/or (b) close my eyes and imagine seeing the lock turn. This indicates that I need 
either my fingers or my vision, or both, in order to correctly remember the lock 
combination. 
 
• As a child, Ian played piano frequently, and quite well. He played many pieces over and 
over again. Now, he has not read sheet music in years, to the point that if he were told to 
play a familiar piece off of the sheet music, his playing would be hesitant and he would 
make many mistakes. However, if his eyes were covered, and he were told which familiar 
piece to play, he could still play it seamlessly, even though he has not played it in years.  
 
                                                
44 This view might be compatible with some sorts of the psychological view, depending on what 
the brain process occurs. But it need not be compatible.  
45 I am not committed (at least at this point) to saying that the brain deserves no special status. 
Just that it does not deserve lone or primary status. It seems be in charge of directing thoughts, 
just as the heart seems to be in charge of pumping blood. 
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What these examples are meant to show is that the brain alone is not responsible for memory 
formation, and perhaps other facets of the sorts of things generally attributed to the brain. Clearly 
other body parts are important in performing these actions; furthermore, it appears (at least in 
example 2) that these alternate methods can override signals from the brain. Unfortunately, they 
do not do much to demonstrate that the brain (and especially the brainstem) is not required for 
certain vital functions. For that, I have some more exciting examples.  
 Significant evidence has been gathered over the past several years that indicates that the 
brainstem is not, in fact, the sole organizer and controller of vital functions. Furthermore, no part 
of the brain is. In fact, many of these vital functions seem to stem from the primary organ of the 
vital function, and it also appears that these organs communicate and also can control some 
aspects of brain functioning. Here are some of these more exciting examples: 
• “Clinicians have observed that patients who satisfy the tests for brain death have shown a 
significant increase in both heart rate and blood pressure when the transplant team makes 
an incision into their body. This would seem to indicate the systematic, integrated 
functioning characteristic of a living organism.”46 
 
• Individuals experiencing whole brain death (including the brainstem) have been observed 
spontaneously undergoing: “Homeostasis…through functions especially of liver, kidneys, 
cardiovascular and endocrine systems…maintenance of body temperature…wound 
healing…successful gestation of a fetus…”47 
 
• There has been research into the so-called second brains that are the heart and the lower 
digestive system. These two systems both have highly complex neural systems that are 
unique to the heart and lower digestive system, but that appear to not only communicate 
with the brain (and other body parts), but also to control it. The heart also appears to have 
several of its own, unique, hormones that help it not only to regulate itself, but also to 
communicate and help regulate other integrated systems.48  
 
I find these examples pretty compelling reasons to think that both: 
(a) the brain (and brainstem) are not the center of vital functioning  
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48 Salem 2-3 and Hadhazy 
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(b) that the body is far more integrated and systemic than it is often credited  
 
These examples exhibit (a) because in all of them, either the brain is absent, or it plays second 
fiddle (at least in some way) to another organ. The amazing thing about the first two examples is 
that the kinds of vital functions that are imperative to life (which Olson says are controlled by the 
brainstem) are performed without the any of brain, including the brainstem. According to Olson, 
these individuals would be corpses! The vital functions of respiration, circulation, 
digestion/metabolism, wound healing and even gestation (perhaps not a vital function itself, but 
it must seamlessly incorporate several vital functions in order to occur) keep happening, and 
sometimes for a long while, without the brainstem’s functioning. If Olson wants to still subscribe 
to the brainstem as the part that gives an individual persistence across time, then he must give up 
the thesis that it is vital functions that matter to persisting.  
 As to (b), the above examples demonstrate this by showing that many of the body’s 
systems work together to preserve each other. Instead of being isolated systems, they 
communicate and interact and provide feedback to each other in order to run smoothly. The heart 
does not only pump blood; it also secretes hormones and sends neural messages to the brain (and 
likely, the lungs) to make sure that the process of circulation (far more than just blood pumping) 
is occurring to the degree it must to fulfill needs for the body. When an incision is made in a 
brain dead body, blood pressure increases, indicating that even though it is (initially) the skin 
that was cut, the information has been relayed to the heart somehow, without help from the brain. 
I am so inclined to think that (b) is the case that I want to make it the cornerstone of personhood, 
by introducing a new emergent, holistic property, one which I (with others) call embodied 
consciousness. I discuss what embodied consciousness is, and how it relates to my thesis in the 
next section.  
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2.2: Embodied Consciousness 
 It seems to me that (b) indicates the possible presence of an emergent, holistic property, 
which is distributed throughout the entire body. I think a good candidate for this property is that 
of embodied consciousness. I also think that embodied consciousness is likely what makes 
people (human animals) persons. This is an accidental property though, since it is obvious that 
there are some cases of human animals that are not also human persons, if person is defined the 
way that Olson (who is working from Locke) defines person. Many of the cases I indicated 
above, of the brain dead human animals, are human animals, but not human persons in the way 
that Locke and Olson mean.49 We are a specific way that (possibly and often) gives rise to 
embodied consciousness, which is one of the emergent, holistic properties that bodies like ours 
have. Specifically, this is the property that makes some people persons. Consciousness, however, 
is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for the kind of thing that we are; it is just an 
accidental property of what we essentially are. Consciousness is a necessary and sufficient 
property personhood (as defined by Locke), and something that we, as essentially human 
animals, have accidentally as a result of the way we (bodies) are.  
 At this point, it should be clear that we are bodies, and it should also be clear that most of 
us also have consciousness, as a result of being bodies. And, it should perhaps also be clear that 
embodied consciousness is one of the emergent, holistic properties we should expect to arise 
from the integrative unity or systematic approach. But it may not be entirely clear what 
embodied consciousness is, and what role it plays in personal or organismic identity. Robert 
Hanna, who has done much work in this area, asserts that:  
                                                
49 This is not a paper on ethics, so I will not say much to the ethical effect, but I also suspect that 
we have different obligations to human animals that are not persons than we do to persons.  
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“necessarily, human consciousness has a full-scale neurobiological incarnation of 
all its states in all the conscious human animal’s vital systems and vital organs—
including the higher brain, brain stem, limbic system, nervous system, endocrine 
system, immune system, and cardiovascular system, right out to the skin, but no 
further than that.”50 
 
What Hanna appears to be asserting by this is that consciousness, at least the sort that we 
essentially bodied creatures have, is spread throughout our bodies, and is not located simply in 
the brain. This fits nicely with the data I have shown about integrative unities and systems of the 
bodies, but why think that just because our bodies are integrated systems that our consciousness 
is too? Could there be a way that our consciousnesses could come apart from our bodies?  
 The answer should be an obvious no. If we are essentially bodies, then how could 
something non-bodied suffice for “us”? It cannot, and furthermore, since we are essentially 
bodies, we cannot even imagine what it would be like to exist without being a body. For 
instance, picture yourself in a so-called out-of-body experience. Do you still see things? Do you 
still hear things? Most people who report having out-of-body experiences report seeing and 
hearing things, such as seeing the doctor make an incision in their body below, and hearing the 
nurses talking to each other. Here is what Hanna has to say about that sort of situation: 
“…the conscious experience of floating high in the sky above one’s own body, 
looking down at it, is not a conscious experience of disembodiment… on the 
contrary, an “out-of-body” conscious experience is simply the non-veridical 
illusory conscious experience of having a strange new birdlike, airy body that 
floats in the air above one’s old non-birdlike, heavy earthbound body.”51  
 
This seems immediately correct to me. When someone reports having an out-of-body experience, 
they still generally report experiencing the sort of things that require the existence of a body. 
Seeing and hearing cannot be done by non-bodied things, because seeing and hearing are 
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physical experiences that happen to physical beings. Consider further what it would really be like 
to not have a body. Perhaps your imagination is better than mine, but try as I might, I simply 
cannot.  
 As I mentioned above, embodied consciousness is one of the emergent, holistic properties 
of our integrative unity, or bodily system. This is an accidental property of things like us, but it is 
at least plausible that it is what gives us our personhood (at least, those human animals among us 
that are also persons). As Shewmon notes, however, integrative unities need at least one of these 
special traits, and although embodied consciousness is important in that it gives some of us 
personhood, it is not the only one. Furthermore, it is the less important one, since we have it 
accidentally. It works out well for many of our intuitions that personhood is an accidental 
property of being a human animal. Since it is accidental, it can come into existence at some 
point, dependent on how the integrative unity is functioning, and also go out of existence, 
without us losing our persistence conditions. Sure, once that property ceases to exist, human 
animals cease to exist at persons, but this does not ultimately affect their identity. This flexibility 
allows human animals to remain themselves regardless of bouts of serious amnesia, Alzheimer’s 
disease, maturation from childhood to adulthood, or even long-lasting vegetative states. Since it 
is the body that we are essentially, and persons accidentally, as long as enough of the body and 
its vital functions remain, so too does the same individual. Personhood can be thought of as a 
special stage in life, much like the terrible twos, or being an angsty teenager. It is something that 
most human animals develop into, and that some human animals develop out of.  
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 This distinction is the case for any sort of body that could have an associated mind. For 
instance, a bunny might be conscious.52 This bunny remains the same bunny from the time it 
develops into a bunny in Mama Bunny’s womb until the bunny body decays. But it could also 
have bunny personhood, as a result of its bunny body. The bunny person would be a different 
type of person than a human person is, as a result of the differences between human and bunny 
bodies. But the bunny could develop its bunny personhood at some point in its bunny childhood, 
as a result of its integrative unity, and then lose its bunny personhood when it gets old and has 
Bunnyheimer’s Disease. It would remain the same bunny though, as long as its same body was 
performing (at least one of) the same vital functions.  
Here is one interesting entailment of the embodied consciousness/integrative unity theses: 
Body swaps (a la Freaky Friday) are not possible. The reason why should be obvious, but just in 
case, allow me to explain. Since consciousness is essentially embodied, changing the body will 
change the consciousness. The original one will cease to exist, and a new one will come into 
existence. But overriding this first reason is the fact that consciousness simply is not separate 
from the body. Consciousness is the body, and so the question of whether or not body swaps can 
happen does not even make sense. Asking if we can swap bodies is akin to asking if Van Gogh’s 
Sunflowers could swap pictures with Van Gogh’s Irises. The question is just nonsense.  
 Another interesting entailment of the embodied consciousness/integrative unity theses is 
that we are not distinguished or identified by our accidental property of consciousness, but rather 
by being bodies. This might sound odd to someone who thinks that we human animals are 
distinct from other animals because many of us have consciousness. But given the embodied 
consciousness and integrative unity theses, it should be clear why this is not the case, and what 
                                                
52 It could be the case that bunny bodies are not the type of body that develops the emergent, 
holistic property of consciousness. But if they are, then this is how it would work.  
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makes us distinct from other animals and organisms. This view also fits with many intuitions that 
other types of animals (perhaps cetaceans, or apes) can also be persons who have a similar 
personhood to us, but without being human animals. Furthermore, it helps us make sense of how 
some human animals are not also human persons.53 The reason that these intuitions are explained 
is because of our likenesses. For instance, I am both a human animal, and a human person, and 
this paper is intended for those like me. So, you and I have relatively similar bodies, and 
probably relatively similar consciousnesses as a result of our similar bodies. Both of us have 
relatively similar bodies to apes, which may also be persons. We probably have pretty similar 
consciousnesses to the apes that have personhood, as a result of our similar bodies, but our 
consciousnesses are likely more similar to each other’s than they are to the apes’, because our 
bodies are more similar. It gets a little trickier with some other animals – cetaceans for instance. 
Our bodies do not look as similar to whales and dolphins as they do to chimpanzees, and we live 
in very different environments.54 But, we are all mammals, and proportionally speaking, our 
bodies are still pretty similar. Certainly our bodies are more like apes and cetaceans than they are 
like crabs or komodo dragons, and we generally think that we have more in common with apes 
and cetaceans than we do crabs or komodo dragons. We probably also think that we have more 
consciousness in common with crabs and komodo dragons than we do with trees or amoebas (if 
indeed trees or amoebas could be said to have consciousness of any kind). I also want to 
emphasize that when I say consciousness, I mean consciousness like ours – there might be 
                                                
53 Again, not an ethics paper, so I do not intend to say much about this. But my thesis might 
explain how we have more obligations to non-person human animals than to non-human persons. 
Maybe.  
54 Environments are important, because bodies generally evolve to work best in a particular 
environment. You and I and chimpanzees are primarily land-dwelling creatures and our bodies 
have evolved to accommodate this (or perhaps, vice versa). Whales and dolphins are primarily 
ocean-dwelling animals, and so their bodies have evolved to thrive in that environment.  
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alternative consciousnesses out there, but they might not be recognized as such. I also note that 
this explanation alone does not explain why we appear to share a more similar type of 
consciousness with apes and cetaceans than we do other mammals, but I suspect that it has to do 
with the internal proportions to our bodies – particularly the size of our brains in proportion to 
the rest of our bodies.55   
 In this section, I have argued that our bodies’ vital functions are controlled not only by 
the brainstem, but also the rest of our bodies’ various systems and integrative unities.56 An 
integrative unity is one that has at least one emergent, holistic property. Consciousness is one of 
the emergent, holistic properties of bodies like us, and because of the integrated unity of our 
bodies,57 our consciousness is intimately tied (that is, identical to) our bodies’ functioning, which 
makes it embodied. There are, of course, objections to this view, most of which will be addressed 
in Part IV. Part IV will consider objections that all Biological Approaches (specifically mine and 
Olson’s) have to answer, such as the Corpse and Fetus problems. I will also answer a few 
objections that apply specifically to my view over Olson’s.  
 Before I move on to Part IV, I want to address the questions I discussed in Part I, to make 
sure that it is clear what my answers are to them. I also want to clearly state what the necessary 
and sufficient conditions are for (a) a human animal to persist across time and (b) a human 
                                                
55 This does not contradict my claim that consciousness is spread throughout the body. Just as the 
heart has a special function in pumping blood, the brain appears to have a special function in 
organizing our consciousness, mental states and language.  
56 I have been using these terms pretty interchangeably, and that is because I think that they get 
at the same thing. The reason I use both, instead of just one, is because I find “system” a more 
natural way to cash out integrative unities, but I like that integrative unities emphasizes the unity 
of the system.  Body systems, such as the digestive system may not always be integrative unities 
(although probably the digestive system is), but I think that integrative unities are always 
systemic.  
57 Strictly speaking, I mean “us” here, but I want to emphasize bodies as us, and it is difficult to 
talk about our bodies as us, for various reasons. It is merely a redundant colloquialism for us to 
say, “my body” or “my consciousness” or “my body’s consciousness.”  
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person. As I mentioned at the beginning of this part, the answer to the question, “What am I?” on 
my view is the same as it is for Olson: I am (along with others like me) a human animal. The 
other question, the one of persistence, we answer differently. Although we both agree that vital 
functions and life are what gives us persistence conditions across time, Olson says that it is the 
brainstem that is ultimately in charge of these vital functions, as well as life, and so as long as the 
brainstem persists, so too does the animal that has it. I disagree, and have argued at length 
against Olson’s position. Instead, I emphasize the entire body as the propagator and cause of 
vital functions. So long as the body continues to have these bodily functions, it retains its 
identity.  
 As for the necessary and sufficient conditions of human animalness and human 
personhood, they are as follows. It is both necessary and sufficient to be a human animal to be an 
organism belonging to the genus and species Homo sapiens. There are probably some in-between 
cases (being the evolutionary “missing link,” for instance) but I will allow scientists to determine 
those cases. To persist as a human animal, it is necessary that the organism undergo vital 
functions, which give it life. Life is one of the emergent, holistic properties that occur as a result 
of an integrative unity. It is sufficient if at least one of these vital functions is occurring. To be a 
human person, it is necessary that the individual meet the criteria for being a human animal. It is 
sufficient to be a human person if the human animal has another emergent, holistic property that 
is an affect of its integrative unity – that of embodied consciousness. 
 
Part IV: Objections to the Biological Approaches 
 
Here I discuss the major objections to Biological Approaches, which includes both my 
view and Olson’s view. I do this to highlight the differences between my view and Olson, and to 
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hopefully leave the impression that my version of the Biological Approach is more satisfactory 
than Olson’s. I also address a few specific objections to my view. There is a different section for 
each objection. Each section includes an enumeration of the problem at hand, and then an 
explanation as to how Olson answers the problem, and how I answer the problem. I finish each 
section by attempting to show why my result is more satisfactory than Olson’s.  
 
1: The Corpse Problem 
The Corpse Problem is a problem for Biological Approaches, because it is concerned 
with what happens to the body that was previously a human animal, and is no longer, because it 
has stopped performing any vital functions. Since the BA identifies vital functions with the 
persistence of identity, once the vital functions are gone, it appears as though that identity is gone 
too. It is as if the body that previously housed the vital functions has suddenly disappeared and 
been instantaneously replaced with something else, which is not identical to, but bears a strong 
resemblance to, the body that just died.  
Olson’s response to this question is to posit that there is, strictly speaking, no such thing 
as a dead animal. In fact,  
“We may call something lying by the side of the road a dead animal, but strictly speaking 
what is lying there are only the lifeless remains of an animal that no longer exists. That a dead 
animal should not be an animal may sound absurd. But then a ghost town is not a town, a dry 
lake is not a lake, a tin soldier is not a soldier, and a dead person is not a person.”58 
 
An animal, according to Olson, is something that is living. As soon as it has stopped 
living, then it is no longer an animal. Another way to explain this is to say that Olson is only 
talking about living things, and how it is that they persist. He is not interested in the persistence 
of non-living things. This is why he rejects the Bodily Criterion in favor of the Biological 
                                                
58 Olson (1997), 136  
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Approach. What Olson has actually done is to restrict the domain of animals to only the living 
animals.  
My response to the Corpse Problem is two-fold. I could accept Olson’s view, because it 
is true that what makes an animal persist for us is its vital functions, and once those stop, it is at 
least plausible that the animal no longer persists. But, since we have different views of what 
makes the vital functions themselves persist (for Olson, the brainstem, for me, the integrative 
unities), I can answer differently than Olson, and in a way that I think is more satisfactory. First, 
since I have an integrative unity view, rather than a brainstem view, death comes later (with the 
complete breakdown of the various integrative unities)59, and so in many ways, it makes more 
sense to say that what used to be a human animal is now a corpse. Another way I can answer the 
problem is to say that death is one of the vital functions60 of a human body; rather than death 
ending a life, it is simply the last function a particular body performs as an integrative unity. 
When the body starts to erode and break down, which happens only after all integrative unities 
(but not necessarily after brainstem death) occur, it makes more sense to indicate that the body 
has become something different – or at least is in the process of becoming something different.  
Olson’s view is compelling in some ways, but it seems at least odd for us to agree that as 
soon as the brainstem stops working that one entity is no longer, and another one (which shares 
exactly all of the same properties as the one that just left, except for one) has come into being. If 
your grandmother is on her deathbed, and then dies, it seems natural to say, “Grandma has died. 
Her body is on the bed.” To Olson, though, this is problematic for two reasons. First, Grandma 
                                                
59 Shewmon and DeGrazia, writing about the same issue, suggest that death occurs when both 
circulation and respiration cease (Shewmon 1997, DeGrazia 115- 158) 
60 I realize that it is odd in some ways to refer to death (or, lack of vitality) as a vital function. 
But it is a function of ending vitality that all animals undergo at some point, so in many ways it 
seems natural to refer to it as a vital function. Granted, I have a somewhat unorthodox view of 
death, but here is not the place to discuss it. 
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has not just died – she has gone out of existence, even if her heart is still beating.61 Death is a sort 
of nonsense word to Olson. In his words, “…bringing an animal’s life-sustaining functions to an 
end and producing a lifeless corpse – what the vulgar call ‘death’…”62 Secondly problematic to 
Olson about your statement over Grandma’s death is that “Her body is on the bed,” is also 
nonsense. Strictly speaking, what you should say is, “The lifeless corpse that closely resembles 
Grandma is on the bed.” My response does not have the same problems as Olson’s; since death is 
something that occurs later, and is a vital function the former animal is not replaced by another 
entity until it starts decaying (which could, perhaps, be another vital function), which is a more 
natural time to think that the animal no longer exists as such.  
 
2: The Fetus Problem 
 There are two versions of the Fetus Problem: one that Olson uses to argue against the 
psychological view, and another that is more directly against Olson’s view. The Fetus Problem I 
am interested in here is obviously the second, which is similar to the Corpse Problem, except that 
it starts at the other end of life. The problem involves when an animal becomes an animal, rather 
than when it stops being one. At some point in its prenatal development, an embryo goes from 
being a bunch of conglomerated cells with no real specialized organization into an entity that 
organizes its own vital functions (with perhaps the help of its external organ, the placenta).  
David Hershenov points out that Olson too, must answer to a version of the Fetus 
Problem:  
                                                
61 Recall that (1) Olson thinks that since the brainstem is the center of identity, then if it stops 
functioning, the animal ceases to persist and also (2) some animals’ hearts can continue to beat 
after whole brain death 
62 Olson (1997) 118 
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“The problem for Olson is that he insists that we cease to exist when our 
brainstem fails. But he gives an account of our origins that have us existing prior 
to the development of a functioning brainstem…we are compelled to ask, ‘Why is 
it that we could exist as a brainless foetus dependent upon our mother’s body but 
couldn’t survive in a brain-dead state dependent upon a hospital respirator?’”63  
 
Hershenov’s query applies to both myself and Olson, as well as other defenders of the 
biological view. The problem here is again, if vital functions are what is important, how do we 
connect an individual that does not currently have its own vital functions with the thing it will (or 
was) become that does have vital functions. Specifically, the question here is for Olson: if it is 
the brainstem that is important, then what is the relationship between the thing that does not 
currently have a brainstem, and cannot perform its own vital functions, and the thing that 
(perhaps in a few weeks) will have a brainstem and can perform its own vital functions. Is there a 
time where, the brainstem starts functioning and the there is a shift of identity from a mere 
bundle of cells into a human animal? 
Olson himself does not respond to this version of the Fetus Problem, but Hershenov tries 
to on his behalf, and in a way that I agree is consistent with Olson’s other stated theories:  
“[Olson] could of course, rescind his claims about the origins of human beings, 
and instead insist that we each come into existence later in a pregnancy when a 
brainstem has developed. And Olson could just deny that there was an organism 
or any other kind of entity before that time, thus avoiding the abrupt ending of one 
entity and its replacement with another or having to accept the existence of 
spatially coincident entities.”64 
 
Again, these are some interesting options for Olson, and I do not think that they are 
completely wrong. But, since I have an integrated unity approach, instead of a brainstem 
approach, once again, I can offer a more intuitive answer. Fetuses become people once they 
develop at least one of the important properties sufficient for the human animal’s integrative 
                                                
63 Hershenov 504 
64 Hershenov 507 
 
 
 
 
55 
unity – life. Once the fetus has developed enough of an integrative unity to survive without the 
womb, it becomes a human animal. This point comes rather late in pregnancies, but it seems a 
natural point at which to start to distinguish the fetus from its mother. Prior to this point, 
distinguishing the fetus from its carrier is difficult because of its complete dependence on it; the 
fetus alone does not have life. This is different from a late-in-life patient’s dependence on 
machinery to keep it alive, because, as I have indicated earlier, pregnancy (though not itself a 
vital function) creates a new integrative unity in the mother, through expanding and creating new 
vital functions. Once the fetus has its own integrative unity, however, it is no longer so 
dependent on the mother to provide them, as it could survive on its own, without her assistance.   
The hypothetical Olson answer, however, because it (again) requires that he either choose 
between the brainstem itself (which does not develop until several weeks into the pregnancy) or 
the vital functions (some of which, like circulation, start within the first 20 days of pregnancy). If 
he chooses the brainstem horn of the dilemma, it is problematic for him because lots of things 
that do not have vital functions still have physical brainstems (corpses, for instance). If he 
chooses the other horn of the dilemma, it is problematic for his view because there are things that 
have at least some vital functions, but which do not have a brainstem (fetuses, for example).  
 
3: Problems specific to Integrative Unity/Systemic View 
 I have tried to point out that the main problem with Olson’s view is that it creates a 
dilemma between the brainstem itself and vital functions. Olson draws on the brainstem itself 
because he thinks that it is the controller of the vital functions, which are important to life. This 
creates problems, though, because there has been much medical research that shows that some 
vital functions, indeed many of them, can be done after the brainstem has stopped functioning. In 
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order to bypass the dilemma that Olson has gotten caught on, I emphasize the vital functions 
over the brainstem. I think that vital functions are spread throughout the body, and this allows me 
to answer many of the objections towards Olson in a more satisfactory way. There are, however, 
some objections that are more specific to my view, which Olson does not have to answer. I 
attempt to suss these out and respond to them here.  
 One possible question might be: how much of the body is required? The answer to this is 
seemingly easy… enough so that the body has an integrative unity and the effects (especially 
life) thereof. Quadriplegics can still have integrative unities, although they are missing much of 
the physical part of their bodies.  
Another version of this question might be, what if a scientist were to slowly replace a 
human animal body with a non-organic substance (such as plastic or metal) such that, none of the 
vital functions were ever disturbed. After the replacement, everything still appears to run on its 
own, and the resulting individual appears to have both life and also even consciousness. Then 
would the resulting entity be a human animal? It seems pretty clear to me that the answer to that 
question is no, but it does poke at an important problem. Olson could answer simply that since 
the brainstem has been replaced, that the organism no longer exists and has been replaced by a 
clever sort of replica. But I may be in deeper trouble here, if only because we could imagine that 
the new individual could still appear to have all of the important vital functions. It could still 
appear to respire, or even asphyxiate under the same sort of conditions that regular human 
animals do. It could still have a pumping heart that delivers blood-like stuff and exchanges 
oxygen and carbon dioxide. If the scientist could create something so similar to a human animal 
out of non-human animal type materials, and slowly, using a real human animal as the starting 
place, then what makes this new creature a human animal, or not? 
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This is a difficult objection to answer, but I do have a few responses. One potential 
response is that, since the scientist is subjecting the animal to undergo this change, anything that 
occurs as a result of this change does not count as vital functioning. This is a promising response, 
and perhaps even the right one. The objection could be strengthened though, and instead of a 
scientist actively changing out particles of the human animal’s body, perhaps what happens is 
that something changes in the environment such that the same effect occurs, only without an 
active agent causing it. If this this scenario occurs, then what? 
It seems unlikely that this situation could happen such that (a) really, none of the 
integrative unities of the original human animal are disrupted. Since it appears to metaphysically 
possible, though, I accept that it could be the case. But, it is important that all of the vital 
functions occur, and in the same way that they would in the case of a human animal. It must be 
able to be wounded, and to heal those wounds. It must really undergo digestion and respiration, 
at the molecular level. And importantly, it must undergo death, since this too, is a vital function 
of a human animal. Also important to this case is that the new being starts out as a human 
animal, so that it has the proper origins.65 Under these exact conditions, the resulting non-organic 
being would still be the same human animal as the one that started out. This may seem like a 
non-ideal situation, and perhaps it is. But given the features I have outlined in the rest of the 
paper, and the exact conditions I have laid out for this being to continue as the same animal.  
 
 
 
                                                
65 I realize I have not said much about this topic, at least overtly. But part of being in the species 
Homo sapiens is having biological origin in that species. If the new being I am picturing were to 
reproduce with another of its kind, I think that that would be a new, related species, one which 
has the same persistence conditions as other animals.  
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